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FOREWORD
The United States is likely to face crucial grand
strategic decisions in the coming years. This being the
case, it is essential to have a rigorous, well-informed
debate not simply about the nation’s current grand
strategy and policies, but about the most salient grand
strategic options and alternatives open to the United
States as well. In this monograph, Professor Hal Brands
contributes to that debate through a probing analysis
of one particular grand strategic alternative that has
become increasingly prominent in recent years—the
concept of “offshore balancing.”
Offshore balancing entails a large-scale strategic
retrenchment of America’s current presence overseas,
and it has often been touted by its supporters as a sort of
grand strategic panacea—an option that will allow the
United States to improve its overall geopolitical posi
tion while simultaneously slashing the costs of its glob
al posture. As Professor Brands argues, however, these
claims are misleading. The sort of large-scale strategic
retrenchment envisioned according to offshore bal
ancing would bring geopolitical and financial benefits
that would likely be modest at best; it would also court
risks and dangers that would probably be quite signif
icant. Offshore balancing may seem attractive at first
glance, but upon closer inspection, Professor Brands
writes, there is much reason to question its desir
ability as a grand strategy for the United States.
The debate about America’s current and future
role in the world will undoubtedly continue in years
to come, as analysts assess—and argue about—the
merits and demerits of ideas like offshore balanc
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ing. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to of
fer this monograph as an important perspective in
that debate.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Should the United States undertake a fundamental
strategic retrenchment? Should it roll back, and per
haps do away with, the system of overseas security
commitments and military deployments that have an
chored its international posture since World War II?
Many academic and strategic studies observers have
answered “yes” to these questions in recent years.
They assert that America’s long-standing, postwar
grand strategy has become both dispensable and self
defeating—dispensable because that grand strategy is
no longer needed to sustain an advantageous global
environment, and self-defeating because it wastes fi
nite means while eliciting adverse behavior from allies
and adversaries alike. The proper response to this sit
uation, they believe, is to adopt a minimalist approach
referred to as “offshore balancing.” Briefly stated,
offshore balancing envisions a dramatic reduction in
America’s overseas military deployments and alliance
commitments, and a shift toward greater restraint and
modesty in U.S. policy writ large. It is premised on
the idea that this type of retrenchment will actually
produce better security outcomes at a better price—
that when it comes to grand strategy, less will actually
be more.
Offshore balancing is thus a concept with growing
currency and salience in the debate over the future of
America’s approach to international affairs. As this
monograph argues, however, the case for offshore bal
ancing is actually much weaker than it initially seems.
Offshore balancing derives its appeal from the notion
that it can produce the best of all worlds—improved
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geopolitical outcomes at reduced financial costs. Yet,
as a more critical assessment makes clear, offshore bal
ancing promises far more than it can plausibly deliver.
The probable benefits of that strategy—both financial
and geopolitical—are frequently exaggerated, while
the likely disadvantages and dangers are far more
severe than its proponents acknowledge. In essence,
offshore balancing hinges on a series of shaky and of
ten unpersuasive claims about what the world would
look like subsequent to a major retraction of American
power. Once those claims come under close scrutiny,
the appeal of offshore balancing crumbles. In all like
lihood, adopting this strategy would not allow the
United States to achieve more security and influence
at a lower price. The more plausible results would be
to dissipate American influence, to court heightened
insecurity and instability, and to expose the United
States to greater long-range risks and costs.
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THE LIMITS OF OFFSHORE BALANCING1
INTRODUCTION
Should the United States embrace a fundamentally
more modest and circumscribed approach to world
affairs? Is it time for Washington to roll back, and
perhaps do away with, the vast system of overseas
security commitments and forward military deploy
ments that have anchored its international posture
since World War II? An expanding group of aca
demic and strategic studies observers have answered
“yes” to these questions in recent years. They assert
that America’s long-standing, grand strategy has be
come both dispensable and self-defeating—dispens
able because that grand strategy is no longer needed
to secure U.S. interests and sustain an advantageous
global environment, and self-defeating because it
wastes finite means while eliciting adverse behavior
from allies and adversaries alike. The proper response
to this situation, they believe, is to adopt a minimalist
approach usually referred to as “offshore balancing.”2
At its core, offshore balancing envisions a dramatic re
duction in America’s overseas military deployments
and alliance commitments and a shift toward greater
restraint in U.S. foreign policy writ large. It is based
on the seemingly counterintuitive idea that this type
of retrenchment actually will produce better secu
rity outcomes at a better price—that when it comes to
grand strategy, less will actually be more.
“Less is more” is always a tempting proposition,
and the attraction seems particularly strong of late.
For at least a decade, offshore balancing has repre
sented the preferred grand strategy for many inter
national relations scholars of the realist persuasion,
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including eminent analysts like Stephen Walt, John
Mearsheimer, Barry Posen, and Christopher Layne. In
the aftermath of the Iraq War and the global financial
crisis of 2007-08, the overall visibility and popularity
of the concept have increased further still. The appeal
of offshore balancing has “jumped from the cloistered
walls of academe to the real world of Washington
policymaking,” wrote one proponent of the concept in
2012; the case for a “dramatic strategic retrenchment”
is gaining strength.3 Offshore balancing, another lead
ing scholar adds, represents “an idea whose time has
come.”4
Offshore balancing is indeed a concept with signif
icant currency in the ongoing debate on the future of
American grand strategy. Unfortunately, assessments
of that concept have often been one-sided and incom
plete. Because offshore balancing commands such
strong backing within the academic strategic studies
community, and because it is generally advanced as
part of a critique of America’s existing grand strategy,
analysts have too rarely treated that proposal with the
sort of sustained, in-depth scrutiny that is required to
adequately judge both its advantages and its limita
tions.5 The aim of this monograph is to redress that
asymmetry through a critical assessment that ex
plicates the core premises and rationale of offshore
balancing in some detail, and then more vigorously
probes its principal claims. The time is ripe for this
sort of examination. The coming years will undoubt
edly confront American officials with choices of great
importance regarding U.S. global posture and policy.
A more rigorous evaluation of prominent grand stra
tegic ideas and alternatives is thus vital.6
The outcomes of such an evaluation cast serious
doubt on the desirability, and even the basic viabil
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ity, of offshore balancing. That strategy derives its at
traction from the idea, as Walt has argued, that it will
allow America to increase its national security and
influence, while also decreasing “the resistance that
its power sometimes provokes.”7 In reality, however,
offshore balancing promises far more than it can de
liver. The probable benefits of that approach—both fi
nancial and geopolitical—are frequently exaggerated,
while the likely disadvantages and dangers are far
more severe than its proponents acknowledge. Off
shore balancing ultimately hinges on a series of shaky
and often unpersuasive claims about what the world
would look like subsequent to a major retraction of
American power. Once those claims come under close
scrutiny, the appeal of offshore balancing crumbles.
In all likelihood, adopting this strategy would not al
low the United States to achieve more security and
influence at a lower price. The more plausible results
would be to dissipate American influence, to court
heightened insecurity and instability, and to expose
the United States to greater long-range risks and costs.
The remainder of this monograph proceeds as fol
lows. First, I briefly outline the basic parameters and
rationale of the postwar (and now, post-Cold War)
grand strategy that offshore balancers criticize. Sec
ond, I unpack the logic, claims, and purported ben
efits of offshore balancing itself. Third, and at great
est length, I critically scrutinize what effects a shift to
offshore balancing would likely have for U.S. interests
across a range of important issues. Fourth, and final
ly, I summarize the findings of this monograph and
briefly discuss the implications for current debates on
American grand strategy.

3

UNDERSTANDING U.S. GRAND STRATEGY
Since World War II, the United States has followed
a highly engaged and proactive grand strategy for
shaping the international order. The particular mani
festations of that grand strategy have changed from
year to year and presidential administration to presi
dential administration, of course, but the underlying
aspirations have remained largely the same. Ameri
can officials consistently have promoted an open and
integrated world economy in which the United States
and other countries can prosper. They have sought
to foster a stable and peaceful international order in
which democracy can survive and flourish. Not least
of all, they have sought to maintain an advantageous
geopolitical balance by preventing hostile actors from
asserting hegemony over any of the three overseas re
gions (Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf) that
are of crucial economic or strategic value to America,
and by locking in favorable configurations of power
and influence within each of these regions.8 These ba
sic goals have oriented U.S. grand strategy for roughly
70 years, representing broad and enduring elements
of continuity in American policy.
The effort to attain these objectives, in turn, has
been anchored by what scholars have accurately
called America’s “most consequential strategic
choice”: its decision to make formal and informal se
curity commitments in key overseas regions, and to
give substance and credibility to those commitments
through the forward deployment of American troops.
In Europe and East Asia, these arrangements devel
oped formally and fairly quickly after World War II,
through the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) in the former region and a hub
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and-spokes network of bilateral alliances in the latter.
Owing mainly to local political sensitivities and the
residual British role “East of Suez,” U.S. presence and
commitments in the Persian Gulf generally developed
later, more gradually, and more discreetly. Regional
nuances notwithstanding, however, this willingness
to assume a forward-leaning security posture in the
core geopolitical zones of Eurasia has long served as
the keystone of America’s grand strategy.9
From the time of their creation, U.S. security com
mitments and force deployments were designed pri
marily to prevent any hostile power from dominating
an area that was of fundamental importance to Amer
ica’s physical or economic security. Yet, these arrange
ments were equally meant to serve several other essen
tial, interlocking purposes. American presence would
submerge historical rivalries between members of the
Western world, suppressing counterproductive secu
rity competitions, and enabling historically unprec
edented cooperation on economic, political, and even
military issues. That presence would also foster—in
Europe and East Asia especially—the atmosphere of
reassurance in which democracy and market-oriented
economies could prosper. It would simultaneously
slow the spread of nuclear weapons by easing the inse
curity and instability that might otherwise encourage
allies like Germany or Japan to develop independent
nuclear arsenals. Finally, American forward presence
would carry U.S. power deep into the most critical
parts of the world, giving Washington an outsized
capacity to impact regional affairs. In sum, forward
deployments and security commitments would act
as the linchpin of America’s grand strategy, produc
ing the influence, stability, and security necessary to
accomplish a wide array of goals.10
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It was a reflection of how enduring those goals
were—and how much U.S. forward presence was
seen to support them—that these arrangements
largely remained in place even after the Cold War
ended. As scholars like Melvyn Leffler have observed,
the United States did not craft a wholly new grand
strategy from scratch after the superpower struggle
concluded.11 It adapted its existing postwar grand
strategy to the more advantageous circumstances of
unipolarity. Washington reaffirmed its commitment
to prevent any adversary from dominating a key re
gion, to ensure that no country could command the
resources and strategic position needed to challenge
American primacy or American security. The United
States also intensified its efforts to spread free markets
and democracy overseas, and to contain those dan
gers—such as aggressive “rogue states” and nuclear
proliferation—that might disrupt a very favorable
post-Cold War order. Finally, and in support of all of
these objectives, America kept large numbers of troops
stationed abroad, while also maintaining—in some
cases even expanding—its alliance commitments. In
the unipolar era, as in the bipolar period preceding it,
American officials averred, these commitments would
foster the stability and influence needed to shape the
international environment to Washington’s benefit.12
Indeed, when viewed from a broad, 70-year per
spective, America’s postwar grand strategy can be
said to have worked quite well. To be sure, the post
1945 record of U.S. policy contains no shortage of mis
steps and costly failures, from Vietnam to Iraq and
beyond. But on the whole, America’s highly engaged
global posture generally has produced the desired re
sults. It has facilitated, as various scholars have noted,
the unprecedented international spread of democra
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cy, and the establishment of a robust global market
economy.13 It has contributed to an extended period
of great power peace, and to the containment of dan
gerous threats—whether regional or global—to inter
national security and stability.14 As recent research
has shown, American strategy has also constituted
a significant barrier to nuclear proliferation, by con
straining the supply of critical components, and by
simultaneously reassuring and dissuading countries
that might otherwise have decided to go nuclear15 and
across all of these and other issues, U.S. alliance com
mitments and force deployments have played a vital
enabling role. It is hardly surprising, then, that even
as geopolitical circumstances have changed, the core
components of American grand strategy—and espe
cially the security commitments that have long served
as its centerpiece—have remained enduring.
But for how long would those arrangements ulti
mately persist? Following the Cold War, some critics
did start to question whether such a forward-leaning
security posture was still essential or even desirable in
a world that now lacked a hostile superpower adver
sary. “Come home, America,” one prominent article
declared; the time had come to seek “the disengage
ment of America’s military forces from the rest of the
world.”16 These concerns, and desires for geopolitical
retrenchment more broadly, have grown far stronger
of late. In recent years, the United States has been
dealing with the fatigue and disillusion generated by
its two inconclusive post-September 11, 2001 (9/11)
wars, and the downward budgetary pressures gener
ated by a brutal financial crisis and its aftermath. It
has simultaneously been facing an international envi
ronment that seems to have become messier and more
difficult than at any other time in a quarter-century.
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These factors have all encouraged growing skepticism
about the sustainability and wisdom of an assertive
American globalism. In few quarters has that skepti
cism been more pronounced than among proponents
of offshore balancing.
UNDERSTANDING OFFSHORE BALANCING
The multi-decade continuity in American grand
strategy rests on recognition of that grand strategy’s
historical strengths. The case for offshore balancing,
by contrast, proceeds from a sharp critique of the leg
acy grand strategy’s apparent weaknesses.17 Notwith
standing the overall postwar success of U.S. policy,
offshore balancers tend to be highly dubious of the
current value of America’s long-standing approach to
world affairs in general, and its existing system of alli
ances and force deployments in particular. In essence,
they believe that, while these arrangements and the
grand strategy they support were perhaps appropriate
during the Cold War, they have become unnecessary,
excessively expensive, and deeply counterproductive
in the post-Cold War era.18
First and foremost, offshore balancers contend
that the long-standing U.S. approach is unnecessary,
because the geopolitical conditions that gave rise to
America’s postwar grand strategy have disappeared.
U.S. security pledges and forward deployments were
vital during the Cold War, they acknowledge, when
Washington’s allies were exposed and vulnerable, the
Soviet Union was expansionist and menacing, and
there was simply no other way of ensuring that vital
strategic regions did not fall into enemy hands. In the
post-Cold War period, however, the situation is very
different. Many U.S. allies are wealthy, highly devel
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oped countries that have, or could easily field, pow
erful militaries. Because the international threat en
vironment has become more benign with the absence
of an aggressive global superpower, these countries
can now be expected largely to provide for their own
security and defense. There is very little short-term
danger of a U.S. adversary dominating Europe or the
Persian Gulf, offshore balancers point out, and even
in the Asia-Pacific, China faces a number of proud
and capable countries that would strongly contest any
move toward regional hegemony. Thus, such vast U.S.
commitments are no longer needed to ensure systemic
stability; America’s forward posture has become su
perfluous, a sort of “welfare for the rich.”19
Not only superfluous, but profligate as well. Off
shore balancers frequently point to the undeniably
high costs of the legacy strategy, particularly annual
defense budgets totaling over $500 billion (or even
higher) in recent years. They argue that these costs
strain American resources in ways that are unnec
essary—given the post-Cold War dynamics noted
earlier—and that will become progressively harder
to manage amid leaner economic circumstances. “In
coming years, the weakening of the U.S. economy
and the nation’s ballooning budget deficits are going
to make it increasingly difficult to sustain the level of
military commitments that U.S. hegemony requires,”
writes one scholar. Likewise, Barry Posen contends
that “the Pentagon has come to depend on continu
ous infusions of cash simply to retain its current force
structure—levels of spending that the United States’
ballooning debt have rendered unsustainable.”20 This
spendthrift approach, pro-retrenchment advocates al
lege, diverts resources from more pressing domestic
priorities. Over the longer-term, it will further com
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promise American creditworthiness and deplete the
fiscal and economic strength upon which national
power ultimately depends.
Even in the nearer term, offshore balancers argue,
current U.S. policies are deeply counterproductive be
cause they elicit adverse reactions from both allies and
adversaries. With respect to allies, America’s posture
can incentivize “reckless driving,” in the sense that
U.S. security commitments encourage friendly coun
tries to take unwise geopolitical risks on the assump
tion that Washington will rescue them when things go
bad. Perhaps more commonly, American guarantees
and presence cause endemic free-riding or “cheap rid
ing” because U.S. allies rationally calculate that they
can underspend on defense as long as Washington is
willing to overspend in order to protect them.21 The
majority of NATO allies spend below the Alliance’s
defense spending target of 2 percent of gross domes
tic product (GDP), while America generally devotes
3-4 percent of GDP to its military. The United States
finds itself expending “increasingly precious funds
on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to
devote the necessary resources . . . to be serious and
capable partners in their own defense,” Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates acknowledged in 2011.22 An ef
ficient strategy would get others to shoulder a larger
burden so that America could bear a smaller one; the
existing approach, offshore balancers allege, achieves
the opposite result.
It also makes the United States less secure and in
fluential by generating various forms of international
pushback. Scholars like Robert Pape argue that exces
sive American power and activism have led to “soft
balancing,” as a wide range of countries, from allies to
uncommitted nations to rivals, collaborate to constrain

10

U.S. action through diplomacy, international institu
tions, and other mechanisms.23 Moreover, America’s
posture purportedly invites more dangerous reactions
from both state and nonstate actors. According to
Mearsheimer, for example, the post-Cold War expan
sion of NATO has served mainly to alienate Russia,
eventually inviting the violent backlash seen in Geor
gia in 2008 and Ukraine since 2014.24 In the same vein,
Layne and other analysts argue that the U.S. presence
in the Western Pacific unavoidably antagonizes Chi
na, which naturally sees that presence as a threat to
its own ambitions and security. The result has been to
encourage Beijing to build up its own capabilities, and
to increase the prospect of sharp bilateral tensions, in
stability, and perhaps even war. “If the United States
tries to maintain its current dominance in East Asia,”
Layne writes, “Sino-American conflict is virtually cer
tain.”25 From this perspective, post-Cold War strategy
has even had the effect of pushing potential U.S. rivals
together, incentivizing Russia and China to pursue
greater geopolitical cooperation in hopes of offsetting
perceived encroachment by Washington.
For offshore balancers, the same counterproductive
dynamic can be found in numerous other areas, as well.
They argue, for instance, that it is precisely U.S. military
presence in Muslim countries that provokes jihadist
attacks: that the stationing of U.S. troops in Saudi Ara
bia from 1990 onward was a key cause of al-Qaeda’s
deadly campaign of terrorism against American tar
gets, and that the occupation of Iraq after 2003 served
as a principal incitement to extremist violence. Similar
ly, offshore balancers frequently argue that post-Cold
War U.S. policy has encouraged rather than inhibited
nuclear proliferation. By this logic, the combination
of U.S. efforts to contain or even overthrow “rogue
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regimes” and the presence of American troops in close
proximity to states like Iran and North Korea have
exacerbated the feelings of insecurity that motivate
nuclear proliferation in the first place. What current
U.S. strategy misunderstands, three scholars write, “is
that U.S. military hegemony is as likely to encourage
nuclear proliferation, as states balance against us, as
to prevent it.”26 In the eyes of offshore balancers, it is
thus American strength, presence, and assertiveness
that stimulate so many of the major threats that the
country now faces.
Finally, offshore balancers believe that the long
standing strategy backfires because it leads to unwise
and self-defeating uses of military force. During the
Cold War, the thinking goes, the Soviet threat pro
vided some discipline against capriciousness in the
employment of American military power. Since then,
however, any discipline has vanished, and simply
possessing a globe-girdling military creates constant
temptations to use that military even when vital in
terests are not at issue. “What’s the point of having
this superb military that you’re always talking about
if we can’t use it?” Madeleine Albright once asked;
for offshore balancers, the comment is indicative of
a broader problem.27 American leaders have become
prone to seeking decisive military solutions to threats
that could tolerably be contained or ignored; they use
the Armed Forces in quixotic efforts to transform for
eign societies and implant liberal institutions on de
cidedly inhospitable ground. The result is not to make
America safer, but to draw the country into unending
interventions that drain its resources and sow resent
ment and resistance abroad. Offshore balancers point
to America’s post-Cold War conflicts—most notably
the invasion and occupation of Iraq—as proof of this
lamentable tendency.28
12

To sum up, offshore balancers argue that the ex
isting U.S. grand strategy has outlived its geopolitical
utility, that it imposes unnecessary and unsustainable
costs on the nation, and that it fosters blowback and
overextension rather than security. The best way to
correct these problems, they contend, is to embrace a
very different approach to world affairs.
Offshore balancing is, at its core, a fairly straight
forward concept. It derives directly from the realist
tradition in international-relations scholarship, and so
focuses heavily—almost entirely—on “system mainte
nance” and the preservation of an acceptable balance
of power. In particular, offshore balancers believe that
outside of the Western Hemisphere, there are three
primary overseas regions—Europe, East Asia, and the
Persian Gulf—that are of fundamental importance to
U.S. interests because of the resources, wealth, and
geopolitical geography that they command. Were one
or more of these regions to come under control of an
American adversary, that adversary might be able to
generate the strength necessary to endanger the Unit
ed States itself or to interfere massively and unaccept
ably with U.S. economic wellbeing. Offshore balancers
therefore strongly affirm a core tenet of postwar U.S.
statecraft—that the essential and overriding goal of
American grand strategy must be to ensure that none
of these regions are dominated by a hostile power.
Where offshore balancers depart from the legacy
grand strategy is in their belief that permanent U.S.
presence and alliance guarantees are neither necessary
nor suitable to achieving this goal. Rather, offshore
balancers argue that under normal circumstances the
United States should depend on local actors to coun
ter any threats that may emerge in the key regions,
fortifying those local actors via political, economic, or
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indirect military support (such as arms sales) where
necessary to maintain the balance. Only when an im
portant regional equilibrium collapses or is in danger
of collapsing—in other words, only when a hostile ac
tor is set to conquer or otherwise dominate the area—
should American military forces go “onshore” to in
tervene. Once the aggressor has been turned back and
the balance repaired, U.S. forces should once again
retreat offshore.29
It is therefore wrong to describe offshore balanc
ing as an isolationist strategy, because its supporters
firmly believe that Washington does have an essential
interest in maintaining acceptable balances of power
in important overseas regions. Instead, offshore bal
ancing is properly seen as a minimalist, or free-hand
strategy, because it asserts that America can attain that
goal while also shedding obligations and resources.30
Indeed, even though proponents of offshore balanc
ing occasionally disagree when it comes to specific
policy issues, they universally concur that their strat
egy involves a significant rolling back of permanent
U.S. commitments and presence abroad. Washington
should quit NATO’s military command and perhaps
withdraw from the Alliance itself, for example, or, at
a bare minimum, it should terminate the peacetime
American troop presence in Europe. The United States
should likewise refuse any onshore peacetime pres
ence in the Persian Gulf (and the Middle East more
broadly), and rely solely on forces stationed “over the
horizon” in the event of a severe crisis in the region.
The situation is somewhat more complicated in East
Asia, where most offshore balancers support mainte
nance of significant naval and air forces as a hedge
against an ascendant China. Yet these scholars also
propose, variously, removing U.S. troops from South
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Korea, terminating the ambiguous U.S. commitment
to defend Taiwan, revising or potentially ending the
long-standing alliance with Japan, and withdrawing
most or perhaps even all American forces from that
country. This global military retrenchment, in turn,
would be accompanied by a shift to a leaner force
structure, involving drastic cuts in overall U.S. ground
forces, and lesser but still deep cuts to the Navy and
Air Force. In sum, offshore balancing calls for a far
more austere U.S. security posture.31
It likewise envisions a more modest, realpolitik
style in foreign relations more broadly. Precisely be
cause offshore balancers are so heavily influenced
by a realist tradition that purports to place cold,
balance-of-power considerations above all else, they
believe that the United States should unapologeti
cally deprioritize issues and relationships that are not
deemed essential to this bedrock concern. Washington
should not seek “ideological” ends like the advance
ment of human rights or democracy—even by purely
diplomatic means—if doing so requires jeopardiz
ing relations with authoritarian countries that could
otherwise be useful partners in preserving acceptable
regional balances. “International politics is a contact
sport,” writes Walt, “and even powerful states can
not afford to be overly choosy when selecting allies
and partners.”32 Likewise, U.S. policymakers should
not maintain such close relationships with countries—
such as Israel—that have long-standing ties of affec
tion with America, but that offshore balancers now
view as more of a strategic liability than an asset.33
Nor, for that matter, should the United States seek to
prevent nations like Russia or China from obtaining
reasonably delimited spheres of influence within their
regions—by asserting dominance over Ukraine or
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Taiwan, for instance—so long as this expansion does
not critically imperil the overall balance of power
within those regions.34
Finally, and not least of all, offshore balancers be
lieve that the United States must scrupulously refrain
from any large-scale use of military force that is not
intimately related to the central mission of preserving
systematic balance and stability. This means generally
foreswearing humanitarian intervention, or the use
of force to promote or restore democracy overseas. It
also means refraining from preemptive or preventive
wars to combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
proliferation, or to topple regimes that are internally
noxious but could nonetheless be contained without
resorting to large-scale conflict. With respect to terror
ism, offshore balancers do normally approve of the use
of force in dealing with the most dangerous and direct
threats. But they strongly favor “light footprint” ap
proaches featuring tools like drones and special forces,
and they strongly oppose turning such interventions
into the sort of prolonged counterinsurgency, nationbuilding endeavors undertaken in Iraq and Afghani
stan. These and other “wars of choice” represent costly
diversions from the core grand strategic preoccupa
tion of managing the global configuration of power,
offshore balancers argue; Washington must there
fore pair retrenchment from its existing alliances and
forward troop presence with a broader shift toward
geopolitical modesty.35
There is little doubt, then, that offshore balancing
would represent a significant rupture with the post
war and now post-Cold War template for U.S. strat
egy, and a retreat from the overall level of assertive
ness and activism that have long marked American
policy. Yet it is important to understand that offshore
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balancing would not be something entirely new for
the United States. As Mearsheimer has written, the na
tion essentially practiced offshore balancing between
1898 and 1945, when it abstained from significant
peacetime commitments in Europe and East Asia but
eventually sent its forces into combat to prevent (or re
verse) the domination of those regions by aggressive
authoritarian powers in World Wars I and II.36 More
recently, American policy in the Persian Gulf prior to
1990 followed a roughly similar approach, with the
United States depending first on local powers to main
tain a regional equilibrium, and then bringing its own
military capabilities to bear when Saddam Hussein’s
invasion of Kuwait broke that balance.37 Proponents
of offshore balancing thus contend that their preferred
strategy is not really anything new. Rather, it repre
sents a tried-and-true concept that America should
once more embrace.
What specific benefits would such a shift bring?
Advocates of offshore balancing advertise four major
advantages. First, and most broadly, a move toward
offshore balancing would purportedly enhance Amer
ica’s long-run global position by putting its strategic
posture on a more sustainable foundation. Washing
ton’s existing grand strategy is itself unstable and selfdefeating, offshore balancers claim, because it forces
the United States to bear disproportionate burdens
and runs counter to the ongoing diffusion of global
power. The value of offshore balancing, by contrast, is
that it would use that diffusion of power to American
advantage. No more would the United States permit
rich and capable allies to free-ride on its own taxing
exertions. Quite the contrary—rolling back U.S. pres
ence in key areas like Europe, East Asia, and the Per
sian Gulf would compel important regional players,
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from Japan to Saudi Arabia to Germany, to assume a
greater role in providing for their own security and
that of the regions they inhabit. In effect, the strategy
would employ the built-in balancing mechanisms
within international relations—the natural tendency
of states to do what is necessary to protect their own
independence and well-being—to sustain a stable and
advantageous global environment, while also distrib
uting the responsibility for preserving that environ
ment more proportionately. “Offshore balancing is a
grand strategy based on burden shifting, not burden
sharing,” Christopher Layne writes. “It would trans
fer to others the task of maintaining regional power
balances; checking the rise of potential global and re
gional hegemons; and stabilizing Europe, East Asia,
and the Persian Gulf/Middle East.”38
Burden shifting, in turn, would facilitate a second
key benefit: markedly reduced costs for the United
States. Almost by definition, offshore balancing would
liberate America from the costs of military conflicts
like the invasion and occupation of Iraq, prolonged
stabilization operations in Afghanistan, and other
such “discretionary” interventions that offshore bal
ancers rule out a priori. More significantly, offshore
balancers claim that the strategy would pay broader
and longer-lasting financial dividends by permitting a
shift to a trimmed-down force structure. Barry Posen
predicts that a more restrained approach would allow
the United States to slash its ground forces by half,
and cut both the Navy and Air Force by between onequarter and one-third, respectively. Likewise, Cato In
stitute scholar Christopher Preble estimates that this
type of strategy would enable major reductions in the
number of carrier strike groups, naval vessels, tacti
cal fighter wings, and other high-dollar items, to say
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nothing of the savings that would come from sharp
cuts in U.S. ground forces. The overall upshot would
be to make U.S. strategy more economically viable,
and to enhance the country’s prospects for sustained
prosperity and balanced budgets.39
Third, offshore balancers believe that this retrench
ment would, in fact, improve America’s ability to
address the most pressing security challenges it cur
rently faces. In great power relations, many offshore
balancers believe that paring back America’s security
presence would make U.S. power appear far less men
acing to regional powers like Russia and China, and
decrease the impetus toward conflict with those coun
tries.40 In the event that a sharper confrontation with
a challenger like China ensued anyway, a shift to off
shore balancing would still benefit the United States
by allowing it to avoid costly diversions elsewhere
and to elicit greater contributions from other friendly
countries in the area.41 From this perspective, behav
ing with greater moderation and restraint would al
low Washington to position itself far more advanta
geously in global strategic affairs.
The results would be similarly beneficial in other
areas. Offshore balancers are virtually unanimous
in positing that an end to U.S. forward presence and
long-term troop deployments in the Middle East
would undercut a primary source of Muslim anger
toward America, and significantly defuse the threat
of jihadist terrorism. Some extremist violence might
still occur, Robert Pape allows, but offshore balanc
ing remains “the best way to secure our interest in the
world’s key oil-producing region without provoking
more terrorism.”42 Pressures for nuclear proliferation
would also be greatly reduced in an offshore balanc
ing scenario. Because offshore balancers assert that
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it is U.S. power, activism, and presence that largely
push countries like North Korea and Iran to pursue
nuclear weapons, they also assert that retrenchment
would attack the underlying causes of rogue state
proliferation. Pyongyang and Tehran would have less
fear for the survival of their regimes; they would, ac
cordingly, have less need for the ultimate weapon.43
Across a whole array of vital issues—great power re
lations, nuclear proliferation, and terrorism—pulling
back would thus make the United States more secure
and effective by easing the pushback that its own
policies have generated.
All of these advantages, in turn, relate closely to a
fourth and final advertised benefit of offshore balanc
ing, which is that it would actually make the United
States more influential in world affairs. By decreasing
unnecessary commitments and compelling others to
shoulder greater burdens, offshore balancers believe,
Washington would increase its flexibility and maxi
mize its capacity to have decisive impact on those core
geopolitical issues that really matter. By defusing the
myriad forms of resentment and resistance that the
current grand strategy allegedly causes, the United
States would simultaneously undercut the pushback
that corrodes its authority and efficacy. Finally, by
playing “hard to get” with friends and allies—by al
lowing them to take less for granted, and forcing them
to work harder to obtain American support—the Unit
ed States could perhaps elicit higher levels of coopera
tion with its international agenda. Retrenchment, in
all of these respects, would have the counterintuitive
outcome of giving the United States additional lever
age in the global arena.44
Indeed, if the arguments of its proponents are ac
cepted as truth, then offshore balancing appears to be
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a nearly ideal strategic concept for America. It seems
to offer the best of everything, promising enhanced
security and influence, and an improved long-term
strategic position, at a significantly reduced price.
What remains, then, is to question whether the under
lying logic and claims of offshore balancing can really
bear close scrutiny. The disappointing but inescapable
answer is that they mostly cannot.
ASSESSING OFFSHORE BALANCING:
OVERSOLD BENEFITS,
UNDERSTATED COSTS AND RISKS
The previous section presented the case for offshore
balancing, by outlining its basic content, rationale,
and expected benefits. This section subjects offshore
balancing to a more critical assessment, by examin
ing the probable advantages and disadvantages were
that strategy actually adopted. As this analysis makes
clear, the case for offshore balancing is far weaker
than its proponents claim. The likely benefits—both
financial and geopolitical—of that strategy are much
less impressive than they first seem, while the risks
and liabilities are potentially quite daunting.
What Savings?
Consider, first, the question of financial cost. One
purported advantage of offshore balancing is that it
will permit significant reductions in defense spending,
and put U.S. strategy—and the country as a whole—
on far better fiscal footing. “We spend too much,”
Christopher Preble argues, especially “relative to al
ternative strategies that will keep us safe, but at far
less cost.”45 There would indeed be some economies
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if the United States were to adopt an offshore balanc
ing type approach. The country would undoubtedly
save some money if it simply refused to use military
force in any circumstance in which a regional balance
was not in imminent danger of collapsing (although
whether this would be a sensible policy to follow is
another matter.)46 Moreover, an offshore balancing
type military could probably be somewhat smaller
and less costly than the current force, and it would
presumably require far fewer overseas bases. There
remain serious questions about how much smaller
and cheaper that force would actually be, however,
and there are important reasons to doubt that offshore
balancing would really yield such significant financial
dividends.
One such reason is that the legacy grand strat
egy—the baseline against which offshore balancing
is either implicitly or explicitly compared—is in real
ity much less expensive than is often thought. To be
sure, defense budgets that routinely exceed $500 bil
lion annually consume massive amounts of money in
absolute terms.47 But when viewed in relative terms—
as a percentage of GDP—U.S. military spending has
actually been comparatively low since the Cold War.
At the peak of that conflict during the 1950s, for in
stance, the United States regularly spent upward of 10
percent of GDP on defense, reaching 14.2 percent in
1953. Even in the 1980s, the figure was often upward
of 6 percent.48 Since the mid-1990s, however, total U.S.
defense spending—including funds for overseas con
tingency operations like the wars in Iraq and Afghani
stan—has generally been between 3 and 4 percent of
GDP. It rose as high as 4.7 percent at the peak of U.S.
deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2010, but then
dropped back under 4 percent in 2013 and has contin
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ued downward since then.49 By relevant post-World
War II standards, the United States has devoted a com
paratively small percentage of its wealth to defense in
the past 20 years, indicating that the costs of American
presence and policy are not nearly as staggering as is
sometimes claimed.
It is worth emphasizing that this holds true even
when the cost of recent U.S. wars is considered. The
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were by far the costliest
U.S. conflicts of the post-Cold War era, with opera
tions and other war-related activities in those coun
tries costing roughly $1.5 trillion between 2001 and
2014.50 Nonetheless, the vast majority (well over 90
percent) of those costs are included in the figures cited
in the preceding paragraph, meaning that, even dur
ing a period of manpower-intensive ground opera
tions, U.S. defense costs were actually quite modest
in historical context. This does not necessarily mean
that the money spent in Iraq and Afghanistan was a
productive investment, of course, but it does put the
price tag of those conflicts in perspective. Moreover,
given that these conflicts were actually massive out
liers among America’s post-Cold War interventions
in terms of financial costs—and that the response to
those costs has already been explicitly to downgrade
the role of manpower-intensive stability operations in
U.S. defense strategy—one begins to question wheth
er a United States that remains globally engaged and
present must necessarily incur the expenses associat
ed with major Middle Eastern land wars on a regular
basis.51
If the current grand strategy is not as expensive as
it sometimes seems, then neither is offshore balancing
as cheap as one might expect. The basic reason for this
is that a military that can actually carry out an offshore
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balancing approach must still be capable of interven
ing quickly and decisively in regional contingencies,
and forcing its way back onshore if a regional balance
collapses. Despite its emphasis on retrenchment, Evan
Braden Montgomery has recently observed, offshore
balancing still hinges on the idea that “U.S. military
power will remain sufficient to prevent any nation
from dominating its neighbors through aggression or
coercion.”52 An offshore balancing type military would
have to possess the aerial and naval dominance neces
sary to command the global commons and provide
access into contested theaters in time of conflict. This,
presumably, would mean major continuing invest
ments in the big-ticket, high-technology capabilities
needed to maintain such an edge. That military would
also have to possess—or very rapidly be able to gener
ate—the ground forces needed to intervene success
fully if a regional equilibrium began to slip away. In
short, an offshore balancing type military would still
need to be very ready and very powerful, capable of
prompt, effective global power projection with all its
massive expense. “While day-to-day demands on the
U.S. military would be less in offshore balancing than
in [a strategy of forward presence],” one informed
analyst writes, “it is not clear whether total military
requirements would be less burdensome.”53
Could such a military still save considerable sums
by closing overseas bases and stationing its forces
within the United States? Not as readily as one might
think. Because foreign countries often offset some costs
of U.S. presence, and for other financial and logistical
reasons, relocating American forces in this manner
achieves only very meager reductions in expenditures.
As one analysis by the RAND Corporation has noted,
stationing two squadrons of F-16s in the United States
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instead of in Italy would result in savings of only 6
percent annually. Similarly, the Congressional Budget
Office has estimated that returning nearly all overseas
Army forces to the United States would yield annual
savings of less than $1.5 billion. “At the level of grand
strategy,” the RAND study concludes, “the cost dif
ferences between CONUS [continental United States]
and OCONUS [overseas] presence are insignificant.”54
The same goes for America’s nuclear arsenal. Parti
sans of offshore balancing have often argued that their
strategy would permit major cuts in U.S. nuclear forc
es. Here too, however, the practical requirements of
a sufficiently resourced offshore balancing approach
are likely to be far more onerous than advertised.
Even in an offshore balancing scenario, the United
States would require a very robust nuclear arsenal if
it hoped to sustain extended deterrence as its overseas
conventional force posture was dramatically reduced.
For if, as the Barack Obama administration noted in its
2010 Nuclear Posture Review, “strengthening the non
nuclear elements of regional security architectures
is vital” to achieving further reductions in the U.S.
nuclear arsenal, then weakening those non-nuclear
elements via American retrenchment would logically
place a higher premium on nuclear weapons.55 Un
der an offshore balancing approach, superior nuclear
forces would also be needed to ensure the escalation
dominance that would allow the United States to in
tervene in regional crises without danger of being
blackmailed or coerced by a powerful, nuclear-armed
rival.56 Consequently, offshore balancing would prob
ably not permit significant reductions in the U.S. nu
clear arsenal. Rather, it would entail the major—and
very expensive—investments needed to modernize
that arsenal in the coming years and decades.57
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When these issues are factored into the equation,
the financial benefits of offshore balancing seem con
siderably less striking. One scholar has projected that
a strategy approximating offshore balancing could be
sustained through military spending amounting to
roughly 2.5 percent of U.S. GDP.58 There are serious
questions regarding whether the resulting military—
which would possess substantially diminished naval,
air, ground, and nuclear forces—would indeed be suf
ficient to accomplish the aforementioned tasks without
courting intolerable risks of mission failure.59 But even
setting those questions aside for the sake of argument,
this level of spending is only 0.5 percent of GDP lower
than what the United States paid for defense in the
late-1990s, and perhaps 1 percent of GDP lower than
what military spending is projected to be in the near
future.60 Stated differently, even if one assumes that a
force costing 2.5 percent of GDP could accomplish its
stated objectives in an offshore balancing scenario, a
shift to that strategy would result in defense-related
savings of perhaps 16 to 29 percent relative to the rel
evant post-Cold War figures.
Such savings are certainly not trivial. If fully re
alized, they might reduce federal deficits that have
ranged from nearly $500 billion to just over $1.4 tril
lion per year in the years since 2009 by perhaps $100
200 billion annually. But even in the most favorable
scenario, these savings would still be much less than
what is needed to balance the federal budget. In fact,
because defense spending accounts for roughly 18
percent (and falling) of federal spending, and because
present and out-year deficits are caused primarily
by spiraling entitlement costs (48 percent and rising
quickly as of 2014), the defense cuts that would ac
company offshore balancing would have only a fairly
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marginal effect on the country’s long-run fiscal pros
pects.61 To put it another way, if the United States
effectively addresses the ballooning cost of entitle
ments, it will easily be able to afford its current grand
strategy well into the future. If it does not do so, then
even far more draconian defense cuts will not close
the fiscal gap.
Finally, it is reasonable to inquire whether offshore
balancing might simply exchange these relatively
modest short-term economies for higher long-term
costs and burdens. Offshore balancing is premised on
the notion that regional balances are inherently robust,
and so the most expensive and dangerous types of
military intervention will be quite rare. Yet an incon
venient truth for offshore balancers is that in each of
the major cases in which America relied on that strate
gy during the past 100 years—in Europe and East Asia
in the period of the world wars, and in the Persian
Gulf in the period before 1990—it ended up having
to wage a major, high-intensity conflict to repair a re
gional equilibrium that had either broken entirely or
was in imminent danger of breaking. In each of these
instances, the United States eventually did beat back
the offending aggressor and restore a favorable con
figuration of power, and so these episodes are gener
ally treated as “successes” by offshore balancers. Yet,
from a long-term perspective, perhaps the wiser and
more economical choice would have been to accept the
peacetime commitments that might have sustained
the balance and prevented the situation from reach
ing such a critical and costly juncture. In Europe and
East Asia especially, it was precisely this hard-earned
awareness that foreswearing onshore commitments
was a penny-wise but pound-foolish approach that
caused the United States to embrace a much different
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strategy from 1945 onward. Many years have passed
since then, but the basic truth remains the same: the
financial argument for offshore balancing is weaker
than it might initially appear.
Exaggerated Security Benefits: Terrorism.
The prospect of financial savings, of course, is but
one aspect of offshore balancing’s appeal. Its propo
nents also claim that the strategy will yield important
security benefits by reducing the severity of critical
threats like international terrorism and nuclear pro
liferation, and better positioning the United States to
deal with those issues. If these claims were true, they
would provide powerful vindication for offshore
balancing and its “less can be more” ethos. In real
ity, however, the advantages of retrenchment are fre
quently inflated when it comes to these matters, while
substantial dangers and drawbacks are often obscured
or ignored.
This is certainly true with respect to terrorism. In
fairness, offshore balancers certainly have a point in
arguing that America’s onshore presence in the Gulf
and the larger Middle East has long served as a key
source of incitement to jihadist attacks. It was U.S.
intervention in Lebanon in 1982-84 that first brought
America into the crosshairs of suicide terrorism by
provoking Hezbollah’s deadly bombings of the U.S.
Embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut. In the Gulf
specifically, the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Ara
bia during and after the Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990-91
was indeed a primary motivator of al-Qaeda’s escalat
ing campaign of terrorism against American targets,
and the later invasion and occupation of Iraq breathed
new life into a jihadist movement that had been badly
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damaged in the wake of 9/11. The Iraq War, National
Intelligence Council Chairman Robert Hutchings com
mented in 2005, acted as “a magnet for international
terrorist activity” and a key recruiting device for al
Qaeda.62 Finally, and at a broader level of analysis,
scholarly research indicates that resentment of foreign
troop deployments and military occupations have tra
ditionally been leading causes of suicide terrorism.63
There is thus little doubt that certain U.S. policies have
fanned the flames of terror, as offshore balancers al
lege. More problematic, however, is the assertion that
their preferred strategy would significantly reduce the
threat.
One key reason for skepticism is that the mili
tary withdrawal that most offshore balancers envi
sion is not the withdrawal that jihadist groups have
demanded as the price of peace. When al-Qaeda and
other groups call for a U.S. military withdrawal from
the Muslim world, they are calling for the removal not
simply of large-scale ground forces and other sizable
units (the assets that most offshore balancers focus
on in advocating retrenchment). Rather, they are call
ing for the removal of all forms of American military
power and influence, including trainers and advisers,
drones, security assistance and weapons sales, and
other tools that would presumably continue to be cru
cial to counterterrorism, even in an offshore balanc
ing context. “Even U.S. intelligence liaison, which in
volves sharing information, training, and other forms
of exchange, is . . . a sensitive issue” for al-Qaeda and
other jihadists, one expert writes.64 This leaves advo
cates of retrenchment stuck with an awkward dilem
ma. Undertaking the truly comprehensive military
withdrawal that al-Qaeda and other extremist groups
demand would utterly cripple America’s approach
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to counterterrorism as well as its broader ability to
support friendly regimes in the region. Undertaking
a lesser withdrawal, by contrast, might still assuage
some anti-U.S. resentment, but it would presumably
not mollify jihadist grievances to the extent that off
shore balancers believe.
This first reason for skepticism is reinforced by a
second, which is that even though the deployment
of American troops on Muslim lands has historical
ly been a cause of anti-U.S. extremism, it has never
been the sole cause. That extremism also originated
from grievances fueled by U.S. policy toward Iraq in
the 1990s, long-standing American support for dicta
torial Arab regimes, the extensive and intimate U.S.
relationship with Israel, and the perceived invasion of
Muslim societies by Western cultural and economic
influences. Many of these grievances were featured in
early al-Qaeda pronouncements, including bin Lad
en’s famous 1998 fatwa declaring that “the ruling to
kill the Americans and their allies . . . is an individual
duty for every Muslim who can do it.”65 Many of the
same issues continue to figure prominently today. As
al-Qaeda spokesman Adam Gadahn declared in 2010,
removal of U.S. troops from the Persian Gulf and be
yond was only one of a series of requirements that
Washington must meet in order to earn a respite from
jihadist attacks:
First, you must pull every last one of your soldiers,
spies, security advisors, trainers, attaches, contrac
tors, robots, drones, and all other American person
nel, ships, and aircraft out of every Muslim land from
Afghanistan to Zanzibar.
Second, you must end all support—both moral and
material—to Israel and bar your citizens from travel
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ing to Occupied Palestine or settling there, and you
must impose a blanket ban on American trade with
the Zionist regime and investment in it.
Third, you must stop all support and aid—be it mili
tary, political, or economic, or otherwise—to the hated
regimes of the Muslim world. This includes the socalled “development aid” . . .
Fourth, you must cease all interference in the religion,
society, politics, economy, and government of the Is
lamic world.
Fifth, you must also put an end to all forms of Ameri
can and American-sponsored interference in the edu
cational curricula and information media of the Mus
lim world.
And sixth, you must free all Muslim captives from
your prisons, detention facilities, and concentration
camps, regardless of whether they have been recipi
ents of what you call a ‘fair’ trial or not.

“Your refusal to release our prisoners or your fail
ure to meet any of our other legitimate demands,” the
pronouncement concluded, “will mean the continu
ation of our just struggle against your tyranny.” As
this statement indicates, anti-American terrorism has
complex and multi-faceted causes, and foreswearing
forward military presence in the Middle East would
satisfy just one of a wide range of grievances.66
By truly adopting offshore balancing, in fact,
Washington would merely inflame some of those
grievances all the more. A strategy that ruled out
stationing American forces in the region would un
avoidably make the United States more dependent
on its authoritarian Arab allies—Egypt, Jordan, Saudi
Arabia, the smaller Gulf sheikdoms—as providers of
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security and stability. During the 1970s, for instance,
America poured arms into the Persian Gulf autocra
cies, particularly Saudi Arabia and the Shah’s Iran, at
a time when it had only a skeletal military presence
of its own in the area.67 Retrenchment today would
similarly imply increased American military sales, in
telligence cooperation, and other forms of support for
local allies, and a general accentuation of the “friendly
dictators” approach that has so incensed Muslim radi
cals. By the same token, even though many advocates
of offshore balancing argue that Washington should
sharply curtail its security ties to Israel, commentators
like Marc Lynch and Colin Kahl have correctly ob
served that retrenchment would undoubtedly height
en American reliance on that country as the strongest,
most pro-U.S. partner in an endemically unstable re
gion. “While some advocates of offshore balancing are
highly critical of America’s special relationship with
Israel,” they write, “it is worth noting that, in practice,
the approach would have to rely on and work indi
rectly through allies such as Israel to help uphold a re
gional balance of power favorable to U.S. interests.”68
In these respects, offshore balancing would actually
mean redoubling certain U.S. policies that have long
provoked terrorist attacks.
Offshore balancing has troubling implications
for counterterrorism in other respects, too. Terrorist
groups like al-Qaeda prosper amid instability and
security vacuums; such instability and vacuums, in
turn, unwittingly can be encouraged by the premature
withdrawal of U.S. military power from troubled ar
eas. One illustration of this phenomenon would be the
U.S. drawdown in Iraq in 2011, which demonstrated
that the removal of American forces from a still unsta
ble context could undercut previous counterterrorism
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gains and facilitate the insecurity in which jihadist or
ganizations thrive. Although that move was generally
consistent with offshore balancers’ desire for reduced
American military exposure in the Gulf, it ended up
facilitating the renewed destabilization of large swaths
of Iraq and the emergence of the Islamic State (IS) as
a potent force in that area. “Had a residual U.S. force
stayed in Iraq after 2011,” one senior adviser to the
U.S. military in Iraq has written:
the United States would have had far greater insight
into the growing threat posed by ISIS [the Islamic
States in Iraq and Syria] and could have helped the
Iraqis stop the group from taking so much territory.
Instead, ISIS’ march across northern Iraq took Wash
ington almost completely by surprise.69

Withdrawal, in other words, does not always lead to a
reduced terrorist threat—its effects can sometimes cut
in the opposite direction.
Finally, offshore balancing would simultaneously
make it more difficult to respond effectively to largescale terrorism by corroding the infrastructure and
partnerships that America has long employed to do
so. As Robert Art observes, the conduct of Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan after 9/11 de
pended extensively on just those overseas bases and
units that would likely be reduced or eliminated as
Washington slashed its forward presence. (Since 2014,
U.S. military operations against the IS have utilized
many of these same assets.) In an offshore balancing
scenario, by contrast, America “would have to start
from scratch to build alliances and gain access to
bases, a difficult and problematic process” that would
likely lengthen the timeline and reduce the impact of
U.S. response. In the same vein, U.S. forward deploy
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ments and security commitments have long fostered
the relationships and leverage that American officials
can use to obtain greater cooperation in the “quieter
phase of fighting terrorism”—the diplomatic collabo
ration, intelligence liaison, and other largely out-of
sight measures that are crucial to defeating jihadist or
ganizations.70 Were America significantly to retract its
security posture, one could reasonably surmise that
the relationships and leverage would erode as well.
Writing in 2010, Daniel Byman observed that largescale military retrenchment “would likely have mixed
results on the threat of terrorism, some of which are
difficult to predict with certainty and a few of which
could prove exceptionally dangerous.”71 This apprais
al still seems appropriate today. Offshore balancing
offers no panaceas when it comes to counterterrorism.
Its advantages are not nearly as clear-cut as one might
think, and significant perils and liabilities lurk just be
neath the surface. As will be seen, that pattern is even
more pronounced when it comes to another secu
rity issue that offshore balancers emphasize: nuclear
proliferation.
Exaggerated Security Benefits: Nuclear
Proliferation.
The idea that U.S. presence and assertiveness actu
ally motivate nuclear proliferation is a consensus view
among offshore balancers, and as with the origins of
terrorism, there is a certain ring of truth to the argu
ment. As political scientists like Kenneth Waltz and
Nuno Monteiro have long understood, the very fact
of American military dominance creates incentives for
weaker rivals to seek nuclear weapons as a means of
ensuring their own security. “There is only one way
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that a country can reliably deter a dominant power,”
Waltz once noted, “and that is by developing its own
nuclear force.”72
This assertion is borne out by historical evidence,
as is the idea that the way that the United States uses
its power has sometimes added to proliferation incen
tives. During the 1950s, China began its pursuit of the
bomb largely in order to address the security threat
posed by U.S. presence in East Asia and to resist coer
cion over Taiwan and other matters. “In today’s world,
if we don’t want to be bullied, then we cannot do with
out this thing,” Mao Zedong declared amid repeated
confrontations with Washington.73 More recently, and
as the National Intelligence Council correctly predict
ed beforehand, the U.S. decision to invade Iraq in 2003
seems to have had the adverse results with respect to
proliferation—in particular, by driving the North Ko
rean and Iranian governments to intensify their own
nuclear efforts so as to afford themselves some protec
tion against suffering Saddam Hussein’s fate.74
Yet if U.S. strategy has periodically pushed its
rivals toward the bomb, there is again much reason
to doubt that adopting offshore balancing would sig
nificantly redress the proliferation problem. To begin
with, even though American policy may be one rea
son why “rogue states” pursue nuclear arsenals, there
are many other reasons as well. Academic scholarship
demonstrates that there are numerous motives that
influence nuclear proliferation, ranging from desires
for international or domestic prestige, to bureaucratic
pressures, to ambitions to wield nuclear weapons as
tools of offensive or coercive leverage.75 Saddam Hus
sein’s quest for nuclear weapons in the late-1970s and
1980s, for example, was envisioned not just as an ef
fort to achieve defensive deterrence against rivals like
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Israel, but also as a means of underwriting aggressive,
revisionist initiatives vis-à-vis that country. Nuclear
weapons, Saddam once commented, would allow Iraq
to “guarantee the long war that is destructive to our
enemy, and take at our leisure each meter of land and
drown the enemy with rivers of blood.”76 Similarly
complex motives have figured in other cases of nu
clear proliferation. The drivers of that phenomenon,
like the drivers of terrorism, are more multi-faceted
than offshore balancers believe, and so altering Amer
ican strategy would address but one aspect of the
challenge.
More likely, offshore balancing would make mat
ters worse, because it would forfeit the leverage and
influence that Washington traditionally has employed
to restrain widespread proliferation. Whatever their
pitfalls, U.S. forward presence and security commit
ments have, on the whole, exerted a powerful restrain
ing effect on the spread of nuclear weapons. As both
academics and government officials have recognized,
U.S. security guarantees and troop deployments pro
vide reassurance that drastically reduces the need for
American allies to seek safety in independent nuclear
arsenals. Those arrangements, the Obama admin
istration’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review noted, limit
proliferation “by reassuring non-nuclear U.S. allies
and partners that their security interests can be pro
tected without their own nuclear deterrent capabili
ties.”77 Conversely, the implicit—and sometimes explicit—threat that U.S. guarantees and presence might
be rescinded if an ally chooses to go nuclear offers a
“stick” that can be, and has been, used to dissuade as
piring proliferators.78 Finally, and no less important,
the United States can use its position of centrality in
the international system—a position that rests largely

36

on its role as provider of security in key regions—to
spearhead other nonproliferation initiatives, such
as efforts to constrict the supply of critical nuclear
components and materials, and to sanction aspiring
proliferators.79
To be clear, these are not merely abstract or theo
retical advantages of America’s long-standing ap
proach to grand strategy. Rather, a host of academic
research demonstrates that in case after case during
the postwar decades, this combination of elements has
been vital to keeping proliferation as relatively lim
ited as it has been. During the Cold War, this mixture
of carrots and sticks played a vital role in preventing
countries from West Germany and Sweden, to Aus
tralia, South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, from taking
the decisive steps needed to obtain nuclear weap
ons.80 After the Cold War, realist scholars like John
Mearsheimer predicted that the collapse of bipolarity
would lead to widespread proliferation in key regions
like Europe.81 The continued provision of reassurance
by the United States helped contain this threat, how
ever, and as Mark Kramer has written, the promise
of robust security guarantees from NATO helped
dampen the proliferation pressures that might other
wise have arisen in Poland and other former Warsaw
Pact states.82 American security commitments and al
liances, one recent survey aptly concludes, “have been
arguably the most important and consequential of the
strategies of [nonproliferation].”83
What effect would a shift to offshore balancing
have on proliferation dynamics? As offshore balanc
ers argue, retracting U.S. presence and posture might
ease some pressures for nuclear proliferation among
American rivals. The number of those countries is
quite small, however, and it is hard to see how, in prac
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tice, retrenchment would reverse the well-advanced
nuclear programs of countries like North Korea. What
significant U.S. retrenchment could quite plausibly do
is to dramatically exacerbate the pressures for prolif
eration in a broader and more meaningful sense. In
East Asia, a U.S. pullback would accentuate insecu
rity on the part of countries that are contending with a
more assertive China, and whose nuclear forbearance
has long been inextricably linked to the American
presence.84 In the Middle East, Iran’s nuclear progress
has already stirred proliferation impulses in coun
tries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates;
those impulses would likely become far more difficult
to repress were U.S. reassurance weakened.85 Even in
a region like Eastern Europe, one can easily imagine
how the destabilizing mix of U.S. retrenchment and
Russian aggressiveness could lead a technologically
adept, and deeply security-conscious, country like
Poland to consider pursuing its own nuclear option.
Throughout the key geopolitical regions, offshore
balancing would run considerable risk of heighten
ing proliferation incentives and encouraging a more
nuclearized world.86
That world, in turn, would probably be more dan
gerous and unstable than the one we currently inhabit.
Some offshore balancers, hailing from the tradition of
defensive realism, argue that the emergence of more
nuclear-armed states will lead to the establishment of
effective deterrence between adversaries and result in
greater geopolitical stability.87 Yet a growing body of
academic research, as well as basic common sense, cast
doubt on this sanguine outlook. More nuclear capabil
ities might mean more chances for nuclear terrorism
or nuclear accidents.88 Proliferating states might not
develop the secure second-strike and command-and
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control capabilities that are essential to decreasing
first-strike incentives and ensuring stable deterrence.89
Recent scholarly work also suggests that proliferation
can increase the propensity for conflict in affected
regions, and that it causes the rulers of proliferating
states to behave more aggressively in the period fol
lowing acquisition of nuclear weapons.90 Especially if
a U.S. withdrawal leads to intensified security compe
titions in key regions—and as discussed later, there is
good reason to think that it might—the results could
be perilous indeed.
In sum, when offshore balancing is subjected to
greater scrutiny, it no longer looks like such a bargain
where proliferation is concerned. For rather than al
leviating a major challenge to U.S. interests and in
ternational stability, it might very well increase that
challenge instead.
Impact on U.S. Influence and Global Stability.
Offshore balancing, then, would probably not pay
great dividends on essential security issues like ter
rorism and nuclear proliferation, and, in key respects,
it would likely cause more harm than good. But how
does offshore balancing fare when one considers the
broader and even more crucial issue at hand—the
question of how successful that strategy will be in
preserving U.S. global influence and maintaining a
comparatively stable and advantageous international
environment? A core assumption of offshore balanc
ing is that retrenchment will not imperil that environ
ment. Offshore balancers believe that a more circum
spect grand strategy will lessen great power frictions,
compel free-riding American allies to bear more of
the load, and thus sustain basic global stability at a
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reduced price. As noted earlier, some proponents of
the strategy also believe that offshore balancing will,
counterintuitively, enhance American influence over
seas. Here as elsewhere, the central claim of offshore
balancing is that less activism and engagement will
produce equal or even better results. Here as else
where, however, that argument is deeply suspect.
Grasping this point requires understanding that
offshore balancers’ critique of the inherited U.S. strat
egy is considerably overdrawn. From reading argu
ments in favor of offshore balancing, one often gets the
impression that American strategy actively undercuts
the nation’s influence and interests, by eliciting wide
spread systemic resistance and making Washington
more enemies than friends. Yet the reality is not near
ly so bleak. Yes, American power and interventions
undoubtedly appear threatening to U.S. rivals, and
certain post-Cold War endeavors—particularly the
invasion of Iraq—were highly unpopular overseas.91
But even so, it is misleading to suggest that American
policy causes such widespread, systematic alienation
and pushback as offshore balancers believe.
As several leading scholars have noted, for ex
ample, the importance of anti-U.S. “soft balancing” is
frequently exaggerated, because empirical support for
that phenomenon is actually quite weak, and because
it is really Washington that most frequently utilizes
the tools of “soft balancing”—international institu
tions, diplomatic coalition-building, and others—to
achieve its foreign-policy preferences.92 Moreover,
and contrary to what one might expect from reading
the offshore balancing literature, the dominant ten
dency of the post-Cold War era has been for countries
to align with, rather than against, America. This has
been true in Europe, where the United States has not
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simply maintained NATO but taken on 12 additional
allies since the outset of the unipolar period. It has
also been true in Asia, where American defense, secu
rity, and political relationships have frequently been
upgraded, intensified, and expanded since the mid1990s. Even during the George W. Bush administra
tion—the years when anti-American sentiment was
probably at its peak—Washington actually increased
and improved its security ties with a wide range of
second- and third-tier states that saw American influ
ence not as a threat but as a source of reassurance and
protection vis-à-vis rising regional powers like Russia
and China. Certain American policies may elicit wide
spread global disapproval, but the recent trend has
been one of “balancing with” the United States rather
than “balancing against it.”93
Far from being a geopolitical liability, in fact,
America’s forward presence and engagement have
long been deeply interlinked with both U.S. influence
and international stability. On the subject of influence,
the security that America has provided its friends
and allies has, in turn, provided America with sub
stantial leverage in shaping those partners’ policies.
“The more U.S. troops are stationed in a country,” one
statistical analysis of this question finds, “the more
closely that country’s foreign policy orientation aligns
with that of the United States.”94 Historical evidence
supports this assertion. From the early Cold War to
the present, U.S. officials have often invoked the sway
afforded by America’s forward presence to prevent
allies from pursuing nuclear weapons, to gain more
beneficial terms in trade and financial pacts, and even
to impact the makeup of its allies’ governments.95 In
the trade and financial realm, for instance, U.S. troop
presence provided a bargaining chip that Washington
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employed to get NATO allies to bolster the dollar dur
ing the 1960s. Over 40 years later, the U.S.-South Korea
security relationship provided leverage that Ameri
can negotiators used to obtain better terms in the U.S.
South Korea Free Trade Agreement.96 More broadly,
American alliances have served as mechanisms for
influencing economic, political, and security agendas
in key regions, and for projecting Washington’s voice
on a wide array of matters. Admittedly, that voice
might not be as strong as U.S. officials desire or some
international observers believe, but it has nonetheless
been quite powerful and pervasive by any meaningful
comparison.
The relative international stability of the post
war period has an equally intimate relationship with
America’s global posture. As even some advocates of
retrenchment concede, the fact that historically warprone regions like Europe have remained compara
tively peaceful in recent decades is not primarily a
function of any dramatic advance in human enlight
enment. Rather, that phenomenon has owed largely to
the way that the “American pacifier” has soothed just
those destabilizing impulses that previously caused
upheaval and war. In key strategic regions, the U.S.
presence has suppressed arms races and geopolitical
competitions by affording the security that permits
other countries effectively to underbuild their armed
forces. Likewise, it has eased long-standing histori
cal antagonisms by providing the atmosphere of re
assurance in which powerful nations like Japan and
Germany could be reinvigorated economically and
reintegrated into functioning regional orders. Finally,
the U.S. presence has been a force for moderation in
the conduct of both allies and adversaries, deterring
outright aggression and discouraging other forms
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of disruptive behavior. America “effectively acts as
a night watchman,” Mearsheimer acknowledges, a
geopolitical “Leviathan” that brings order and stabil
ity to an otherwise anarchical realm.97 “The contribu
tion that the United States makes” to preventing the
febrile international instability of earlier eras, an
other prominent political scientist observes, “is simi
lar to the services that governments provide within
sovereign states.”98
What consequences would follow if the United
States retracted the presence and commitments that
have permitted it to play this role? While the future
cannot be predicted with certainty, the most logi
cal and obvious result would be to imperil influence
and stability alike. On the former issue, it is simply
not clear why American influence in other countries’
and regions’ affairs would persist—much less ex
pand—if the policies and presence that have so long
enabled that influence were abandoned. It seems far
more probable that actors who no longer benefitted
from such strong and visible U.S. support would have
considerably less reason to defer to American wishes,
just as it seems probable that the weakening or ter
mination of U.S. alliances would leave Washington
with diminished ability to exert leadership in crucial
regions. Likewise, a major geopolitical pullback could
make it more difficult to maintain the regular inter
national military training and exercises that expand
American reach by promoting interoperability with
friends and partners.99 In effect, forward presence and
security commitments have been the currency that
Washington uses to buy a good portion of its interna
tional influence. A broad-based retrenchment would
presumably devalue that currency and weaken other
mechanisms that Washington has traditionally used
to shape relationships and project its global voice.
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Retrenchment would seem a little less danger
ous when it comes to international stability. Offshore
balancers may be right to predict that their strategy
would compel local or regional powers to devote ad
ditional resources to defense, and perhaps mitigate
certain issues of contention with those nations that
are currently antagonized by U.S. presence.100 Cutting
Taiwan loose would certainly remove one potential
flashpoint vis-à-vis China; reducing or eliminating
the American military presence in Europe might in
deed meet with Russian approbation. The problem,
alas, is that it is also logical to expect that removing
the American pacifier would unleash the more per
nicious impulses that U.S. presence traditionally has
suppressed. Security competitions that have long lain
dormant might reawaken and intensify as countries
more actively built up their own military capabilities.
Long-repressed national rivalries might reignite fol
lowing the elimination of strong American presence
and the reassurance it offers. Additionally, while revi
sionist powers that dislike existing orders in Europe,
the Persian Gulf, or East Asia would probably take a
positive view of American retrenchment, they might
just as likely exploit the retraction of U.S. power to as
sert their own claims more forcefully. In sum, if one
accepts Mearsheimer’s own view that Washington
has long played Leviathan in crucial regions, then it
is hard to dispute the corresponding concern: “Take
away that Leviathan, and there is likely to be big
trouble.”101
As with the question of nuclear proliferation, this is
more than a theoretical concern. It does not take much
imagination to see where and how such trouble might
reemerge today. In Europe, normally the most peace
ful and stable of the three major regions, a progres
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sively more aggressive Russia is already destabilizing
neighboring states, using force to redraw national
boundaries, and generally contesting the post-Cold
War notion of a continent whole, free, and at peace.102
In the Middle East and particularly the Persian Gulf,
growing Iranian assertiveness has provoked profound
regional anxieties that have played out in proxy wars
in Syria and Yemen, as well as hints of a potential
arms race—all as the Gulf countries simultaneously
face the instability and violence associated with the
rise of the IS. Not least of all, China’s ascendancy is
jostling the regional order in East Asia. Beijing’s terri
torial claims and military buildup have sparked rising
tensions with its neighbors, many of which—such as
South Korea and Japan—still harbor lingering histori
cal animosities vis-à-vis one another. In the early postCold War period, one analyst famously argued that
East Asia was “ripe for rivalry”; even with a continu
ing U.S. presence, that description seems increasingly
apt today. Across these regional contexts, there is thus
much reason to worry that the result of retrenchment
would not be low-cost, post-American stability, but
rather intensified turmoil and upheaval.103
Some offshore balancers acknowledge as much, and
argue that Washington could accept—perhaps benefit
from—such instability so long as it did not permit a
hostile power to dominate a core region of Eurasia.104
The trouble with this assertion is that it ignores the
damage that increased global instability could inflict
on important U.S. interests even if a regional hegemon
did not emerge. For one thing, it seems unlikely that
greater global conflict and turmoil would facilitate the
intensive multilateral collaboration needed to address
transnational problems ranging from climate change
to pandemics to piracy. It seems just as improbable
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that such an atmosphere would conduce to the con
tinued flourishing and spread of liberal democracy.
Scholars widely recognize that, in places from Germa
ny and Japan during the Cold War to Eastern Europe
in the 1990s, American presence and/or guarantees
helped incentivize democratic reforms and foster the
security in which liberal institutions could succeed.105
There is equally recognition that “a stable and pros
perous world is more conducive to democratic spread
and human rights protection than an unstable, less
prosperous world.”106 Offshore balancing, therefore,
would not simply downgrade the democracy-pro
motion initiatives that have facilitated liberalism’s
remarkable advance in recent decades.107 The greater
instability that would likely follow an American re
trenchment could also prove quite damaging to hopes
for the continued strength and spread of the political
institutions that the United States prefers.
The consequences for the increasingly integrated
global economy that Washington has long promoted
could be just as problematic. As Michael Mandelbaum
and other scholars have correctly noted, the tremen
dous gains toward international openness and pros
perity during the postwar decades have been critically
enabled by American forward presence and the rela
tive stability and security it affords.108 That forward
presence has protected critical sea lanes and secured
the global commons, while also containing the geopo
litical conflicts that might, by erupting, badly disrupt
an interlinked world economy. In Europe, for instance,
American protection has long provided the shield
behind which continental integration could occur; in
East Asia, the persistence of U.S. presence after the
Cold War has had the intention—and effect—of un
derwriting similar advances.109 To be clear, the ques

46

tion of how global trade and finance would react in an
atmosphere of greater instability can only be conclu
sively answered when such a scenario comes to pass.
Yet it would seem Pollyannaish to predict that global
interchange would not be affected negatively by in
tensifying geopolitical competition in areas of tremen
dous significance to an interwoven world economy.
What all of this suggests is that offshore balancing
could reasonably be expected to undermine, rather
than preserve, U.S. influence and international stabili
ty, and that even if America’s physical safety were not
directly jeopardized by post-retrenchment turmoil,
some of its key national interests might be. Then there
is the greatest danger that a strategy of offshore bal
ancing would court—the danger that a crucial region
might not actually be able to keep its balance absent
U.S. forward presence.
Could the Balance Break?
Whether it was ultimately reversible or not, the col
lapse or severe deterioration of a key regional balance
would have grave implications for the United States.
In the worst case, such a development could produce
a seismic shift in the global balance of power and ne
gate a core goal of postwar American grand strategy.
Even in the best case, it would require what would
likely be a major military intervention to restore the
broken balance and defeat the offending aggressor.
Either way, the costs and dangers involved could eas
ily be immense. If adopting offshore balancing could
reasonably lead to heightened risks of such a scenario,
there would be another strong reason to doubt that
strategy’s basic viability.
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Offshore balancers generally believe that there
is little danger of such a scenario materializing, be
cause bids for regional hegemony will provoke a
timely counterbalancing response from states within
the region, and because America can move quickly
to head off growing threats before they become truly
critical. Viewed through the lens of history, however,
these assumptions appear somewhat questionable. As
mentioned previously, the fact is that “underbalanc
ing” happens: in the world wars and the Persian Gulf
War, local actors ultimately proved unable to contain
aspiring regional hegemons.110 In two of those cases—
World War II and the Gulf War—the balance broke,
or severely eroded, in surprisingly rapid fashion. In
April 1940, it was certainly not obvious to most ob
servers that Great Britain and France were entirely
incapable of checking German power on continental
Europe, and that this regional balance would have
collapsed entirely within 6 weeks.111 In mid-1990, U.S.
officials only belatedly recognized that Saddam Hus
sein intended to conquer Kuwait and fundamentally
alter the balance in the Gulf, and by the time they
came to that realization, there was essentially noth
ing they could do to impede the Iraqi assault. (Nor,
in the days following the invasion, was there much
that U.S. forces could have done to impede a followon attack into Saudi Arabia.)112 The belief that regional
balances are inherently robust and that Washington
can see adverse shifts coming in time to prevent them
without having to fight a major war is thus shakier
than it seems.
Since the early-1990s, of course, the global secu
rity environment has been comparatively benign by
historical standards, and so the prospect that a hostile
regional hegemon might again emerge has seemed far
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more remote. Even today, there is very little near-term
likelihood that any U.S. adversary could marshal the
power to dominate Europe, East Asia, or the Persian
Gulf, even if America left those regions entirely to
their own devices. Looking toward the medium- and
long-range future, however, there is at least one ris
ing power that might seriously threaten the existing
balance within its region.
That country, obviously, is China. Today, China
still falls well short of the level of power needed to
assert regional dominance even in the absence of U.S.
presence.113 Moreover, it is not clear that China will as
pire to such regional dominance as its power increas
es. Yet a peaceful rise cannot be guaranteed, either,
and China’s ability to pursue regional primacy could
increase markedly in the decades to come. Explosive
economic growth and a long-term military buildup
have already had a pronounced impact on the military
balance vis-à-vis neighbors like Taiwan, Vietnam, the
Philippines, and Japan. If Chinese economic growth
continues apace, and if China’s defense budget con
tinues to register annual increases of 10 percent or
more, then other East Asian countries will eventually
confront enormous difficulty in balancing Beijing’s
power—even if they overcome collective action prob
lems and their own historical antagonisms to cooper
ate in that undertaking. This prospect is one that is
clearly recognized even by some leading proponents
of American retrenchment. As one offshore balancer
puts it, “The United States will have to play a key role
in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are
not strong enough to do it by themselves.”114
Yet if this assessment is accurate—and there is ev
ery reason to think that it is—then offshore balancing
becomes a highly risky and potentially counterpro
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ductive course of action. As noted, some analysts have
argued that adopting that strategy would actually im
prove Washington’s ability to counter Chinese power,
by strengthening U.S. flexibility, better leveraging the
capabilities of local actors, and divesting America of
distracting onshore commitments in other regions.
But here again, this analysis glosses over a range of
more worrisome possibilities. As mentioned earlier,
U.S. retrenchment could motivate exposed local actors
like South Korea or Japan to pursue their own nuclear
arsenals, thereby impelling regional arms races and
heightening tensions further. Or, perhaps more dan
gerously still, a U.S. pullback might facilitate the very
outcome that offshore balancers aim to avert. As Rob
ert Gilpin wrote in his classic work, War and Change in
World Politics:
Retrenchment by its very nature is an indication of
relative weakness and declining power, and thus re
trenchment can have a deteriorating effect on relations
with allies and rivals. Sensing the decline of their pro
tector, allies try to obtain the best deal they can from
the rising master of the system. Rivals are stimulated
to ‘close in,’ and frequently they precipitate a conflict
in the process.

Retrenchment can be carried out successfully, Gilpin
acknowledges, but in a charged geopolitical environ
ment it is usually a fraught and perilous path.115
This warning has particular salience in the East
Asian context. In that region, U.S. allies as well as for
mally nonaligned countries count on American sup
port and presence to help them manage their relation
ships with an increasingly powerful, and increasingly
abrasive, Beijing. As analysts like Zachary Selden have
observed, these countries seek visible U.S. backing

50

and reassurance precisely because they fear that they
could not otherwise balance a rising China. “America
is now an alternative to China,” said one Vietnamese
observer as early as 2000. “To counter the Chinese
threat we must lean toward the West.”116 Similar com
ments have become ubiquitous in the years since then.
In these circumstances, and contrary to what off
shore balancers expect, a significant American re
trenchment might not have the desired effect of com
pelling these countries to resist more determinedly
and successfully potential Chinese expansion. In
stead, it might incentivize them to acquiesce to, or
perhaps bandwagon with, an assertive Beijing if they
calculated that the odds of effective resistance were
declining as Washington pulled back. If U.S. presence
in Asia were weakened, one Thai commentator has
predicted, Asian countries would have to conclude
that “the region will no longer be a place where only
one major power plays a dominant role,” and hedge
their bets accordingly. Likewise, one analysis of U.S.
security relationships concludes that while reducing
the American military presence in the Pacific might
bring some budgetary savings, “in Vietnam, Austra
lia, or the Philippines . . . such a shift could prompt a
wholesale reevaluation of national defense policy and
have costly implications.”117 In sum, if one expects that
Asian countries will have great difficulty checking
Chinese power without U.S. assistance, then reducing
Washington’s role in the area could actually discour
age local balancing and pave the way for Beijing’s
ascent.118
Offshore balancing could plausibly encourage this
undesirable outcome in other ways, as well. As Gilpin
notes, when retrenchment is viewed as weakness or
lack of commitment, it can cause revisionist powers
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to push harder against the contours of the existing or
der. This danger cannot be ignored in the Asia-Pacific.
There is evidence to suggest, as offshore balancers
argue, that a desire to counteract U.S. presence and
security commitments in the region has been an im
portant motivator of China’s post-Cold War military
buildup.119 Yet there is also evidence to suggest that
U.S. presence and commitments nonetheless have had
an overall tempering effect on Chinese behavior, by
limiting opportunities for intimidation and expan
sion, and by raising the likely costs of aggressive or
destabilizing behavior.120 If the United States were to
now begin reducing that presence, it might logically
undercut the tempering effect in the process, for a U.S.
retrenchment would have the practical consequence
of accentuating the growing power disparity between
Beijing and its neighbors, and creating greater uncer
tainty in Chinese minds as to whether Washington
would actually come to those countries’ defense in a
crisis. The upshot could be to incentivize precisely the
sort of expansionist behavior that would challenge the
regional order.121
Finally, if an offshore balancing type approach
might therefore encourage adverse shifts in the re
gional equilibrium, it would equally complicate U.S.
efforts to respond to those shifts. Offshore balancing
assumes that the United States would be able to inter
vene adeptly to prevent such changes (or to reverse
them if they did occur), and that retrenching from oth
er regions would provide greater flexibility and lever
age in addressing adverse events in the Asia-Pacific.
But the crucial flaw in the logic of retrenchment is that
going offshore generally makes it harder rather than
easier to affect the regional equilibrium.122 Right now,
U.S. forward presence affords America a number of
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critical advantages that it can draw on in shaping the
regional climate in East Asia and responding to crises
should they emerge: strong and deeply institutional
ized alliances; established patterns of basing, logistics,
and access; high degrees of interoperability that come
through near-continual training with friendly mili
taries; and others. These assets not only help check
Chinese power and hedge against unwelcome devel
opments in peacetime. They would also serve as the
indispensable foundation of Washington’s response
should the region nonetheless descend into conflict,
providing a preexisting framework and infrastructure
for large-scale U.S. intervention.
Were these assets to be devalued or liquidated via
retrenchment, however, then the United States would
face a far greater challenge. In peacetime, it would
possess fewer of the instruments and arrangements
that have long allowed it to influence the behavior
of allies and adversaries, and head off unfavorable
events before they occur. In wartime, the disadvantag
es would be greater still. The United States would face
the daunting prospect of assembling the necessary
coalitions, access, and basing agreements on the fly.
It would confront the problems inherent in working
with foreign governments and militaries with which
it had less familiarity and fewer ongoing ties. It would
have to overcome the considerable logistical challeng
es of moving a greater proportion of the required forc
es into theater, and perhaps fighting its way back into
a region after an adversary had exploited U.S. absence
to stake out a more formidable position there. And, of
course, it would have to do all of this amid the intense
pressure of a brewing or ongoing conflict. “Getting
out of the marginal seas might be easy,” two experts
on naval strategy conclude. “Getting back in would
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be a different proposition entirely.”123 Or, as another
leading scholar appropriately puts it, “Beefing up a
preexisting presence in an emergency is easier than
re-establishing one from scratch in a crisis.”124
Offshore balancers would do well to keep these
warnings in mind. The strategy they recommend
promises to preserve regional balances at reduced
costs. But instead, it might well heighten the risk of
dangerous developments in a key region like East
Asia, while simultaneously exacerbating the hazards
and difficulties of an American response.125
CONCLUSION
Is offshore balancing truly an idea whose time has
come? Does that grand strategy represent the right
path forward for America? A growing number of ob
servers in the strategic studies and policy communities
believe that this is the case. They argue that America’s
long-standing postwar grand strategy has outlived its
utility, and that the danger to U.S. interests now lies
not in doing too little, but rather in doing too much.
Accordingly, they believe that adopting the more re
strained global posture entailed by offshore balanc
ing can actually produce superior overall outcomes
at a bargain price. This “less can be more” ethos has
proven quite attractive in the post-Iraq, post-financial
crisis context, and it has given offshore balancing an
increasing currency and prominence in debates on the
future of Washington’s stance toward the world. As
two informed analysts have written, “Who could ob
ject to a strategy designed to reduce costs and risks to
the United States, bolster America’s good name in for
eign capitals, and encourage Eurasian states to man
age their own affairs?”126
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All that glitters is not gold, however, and, upon
closer inspection, the luster of offshore balancing
fades considerably. Proponents of that strategy have
certainly performed a valuable service in illuminating
certain downsides of America’s current global posture,
and in forcing defenders of that posture to clarify and
more persuasively articulate their arguments.127 Yet as
this monograph has demonstrated, the case for shift
ing to offshore balancing is ultimately much weaker
than it might first appear. Across a broad range of cru
cial issues—from budgetary impact, to key security
threats like terrorism and nuclear proliferation, to the
retention of American global influence and a stable
and congenial international environment—the prob
able advantages of large-scale retrenchment are less
significant than frequently advertised. The probable
disadvantages, by contrast, are quite significant and
compelling. Offshore balancing may purport to be a
near-optimal grand strategy that can deliver low-cost
security, stability, and influence for the United States.
Yet, were Washington actually to adopt that approach,
the more plausible the outcome might well be to en
danger precisely the security, stability, and influence
that American statecraft traditionally has provided,
and to swap relatively modest near-term economies
for a host of sobering long-term risks and costs.
The analysis presented here thus argues strongly
against a turn to offshore balancing as America’s
grand strategy. More broadly, it argues for a healthy
dose of skepticism in evaluating proposals for a major
departure from the core patterns of postwar U.S. state
craft. As the current popularity of offshore balancing
illustrates, at times of geopolitical difficulty and con
straint, it can be tempting to seek refuge in a sort of
grand strategic panacea: in this case, an approach that

55

promises to maintain the essential blessings of the
post-1945 order without imposing the long-standing
costs and requirements of sustaining that order. Yet
the unfortunate reality is that panaceas rarely pan out,
and in the case of offshore balancing, it quickly be
comes apparent that one cannot easily shed the bur
dens of U.S. postwar strategy without endangering
the benefits as well. As the debate over America’s cur
rent and future global role continues, it will therefore
be advisable to maintain a high standard of proof in
evaluating proposals for a significant shift in Ameri
can strategy. For while less can indeed sometimes
be more, in grand strategy as in many things, less is
usually just less.128
What does all of this mean with respect to the U.S.
Army in particular, and with respect to American
Landpower in general? At a minimum, it means that
the United States will continue to possess a compel
ling strategic rationale for maintaining robust, readily
deployable ground forces capable of projecting power
and presence in crucial regions around the world. To be
clear, the maintenance of American forward presence,
and the projection of American power, has been and
will remain a task for all of the services, and one that
involves air, sea, and ground forces alike. Moreover,
just as the role of American Landpower expanded at
the margins during the manpower intensive conflicts
in Iraq and Afghanistan following 2001, it has been
natural and appropriate to undertake some rebalanc
ing of the joint force more recently, as such conflicts
have come to play a less dominant role in U.S. mili
tary and defense strategy. Yet just as the United States
would be unwise to embrace a dramatic retrenchment
in its overall geopolitical posture, it would be no less
unwise to heed calls for drastic cuts—up to 50 percent,
as proposed by some analysts—in its ground forces.129
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The reasons for this are manifold, but the basic
underlying theme is that U.S. Landpower remains es
sential to delivering the benefits that the legacy grand
strategy has long provided, and that offshore balanc
ing would likely jeopardize. Through their forward
presence, U.S. ground forces often represent the em
bodiment of both reassurance and deterrence, by pro
viding a very tangible manifestation of Washington’s
commitment to a given country or region. They enable
regular training and exercises with partner nations,
thereby improving U.S. relationships and influence in
peacetime, and promoting crucial interoperability in
times of crisis. Not least of all, they constitute a stra
tegic hedge against unfavorable geopolitical develop
ments, and a means of meeting those developments
early, should they nonetheless materialize. One recent
white paper on strategic Landpower puts it aptly:
Forward deployed, actively engaged forces have prov
en essential to contributing to peace by reassuring our
friends and deterring our enemies. Such forces provide
a broad range of benefits that includes: demonstration
of U.S. commitment, establishment of enduring rela
tionships with regional military and political leaders,
improved capabilities of hosts to handle their own
internal security challenges, increased willingness of
hosts to participate in friendly coalitions, ability of the
U.S. to achieve a higher level of understanding than is
possible just with technical means, reduced chance of
experiencing strategic surprise, reduced change that
an aggressor will miscalculate U.S. resolve or capabil
ity, and increased responsiveness to crises.

If the United States seeks to avoid the geopolitical
dangers associated with large-scale retrenchment, it
will need to retain strong, effective Landpower as a
key part of a balanced joint force.130
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To conclude by returning to the broader grand
strategic picture, it merits stating explicitly that this
analysis is not meant to foreclose the possibility of any
adaptation, flexibility, or retrenchment in Washing
ton’s approach to international affairs. As the events
of the post-9/11 years made quite apparent, when it
comes to grand strategy, too much assertiveness can
be just as dangerous as too much restraint. And as
recent scholarship has underscored, any successful
grand strategy—whether within a given presidential
administration, or over a longer period of time—virtu
ally always entails some degree of change within con
tinuity.131 Indeed, the postwar grand strategy has itself
featured a process of near-continual refinement at the
margins, as American policymakers have adapted to
shifting challenges and circumstances, and corrected
for prior underreach or overreach, while still affirm
ing the basic underlying approach of energetic global
engagement.132 This was the tack taken by the Dwight
Eisenhower administration upon inheriting President
Harry Truman’s costly conflict in Korea, for example,
and by the Richard Nixon administration as it sought
to grapple with American overextension in Vietnam.133
One needs to look no further than the Obama admin
istration’s recent policies to see this dynamic at work
today. Since taking power in 2009, that administration
consistently has affirmed the imperative of U.S. global
engagement and leadership, even as it has also sought
to rebalance that engagement geographically, and to
avoid the large-scale, protracted military interven
tions that characterized its predecessor’s approach.134
This process of strategic adjustment—as opposed
to a wholesale change of strategy—will continue
to be necessary in the coming years, so as to pre
serve the myriad advantages of America’s postwar
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posture, while still allowing U.S. statecraft to adapt to
the changes that invariably occur in the international
environment. Precisely what such adjustment might
look like in practice is beyond the scope of this mono
graph, as this subject would require an extended treat
ment of its own. Yet it is worth noting that informed
analysts such as Peter Feaver, Bruce Jentleson, and
Robert Art have already mooted various proposals for
how the United States might effectively refine and re
calibrate its traditional approach, so as to better reflect
current constraints, problems, and opportunities.135
Looking to the future, American officials would do
well to focus their energies on accomplishing this fa
miliar task of accommodating inevitable change with
in a framework of broader continuity. As this mono
graph has argued, they would do equally well to reject
the more extreme option of broad-based retrenchment,
and to resist the tempting but false allure of offshore
balancing.
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